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ABSTRACT
Tax-deferredsavings are potentially an importantcomponent of
savings for retirement and could
represent a very substantial increasein
tax-free savings formany employees. 1RAS may also havea substantial
effect Ofl nationalsavings. Total IRA contributionsin 1982 were over 29
billion dollars. Despite theprogram's size and potential
significance,
little is known about thedeterminants of IRA contributions.This paper
presents: (1) analysis of the effectof individual attributeson whether a
person contributes, (2) analysis ofthe effect of individualattributes on
how much is contributed,
and (3) simulations of theeffect of potential
changes in contribution limitson the amount that is contributedto IRA
accounts. Results of a similaranalysis based on Canadian dataare compared
with results for the UnitedStates. Persons with lowincomes are unlikely
to have IRA accounts. In
addition, after controlling forincome, age, and
other variables, personswithout private pensionplans are no more likely
than those with them toContribute to an IRA. Theanalysis of Canadian data
yields similar findings, andindeed specific parameterestimates for the two
countries are very similar.Simulations based on the estimatessuggest that
the current Treasury
Department proposal would leadto about a 30 percent
increase in IRA contributions
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To encourage employees not coveredby private pension plans to save
for retirement, individual retirementaccounts (IRA) were established in
1974 as part of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act. Emphasizing
the need to enhance economic
well-being of future retirees and the needto
increase national savings, the EconomicRecovery Tax Act of 1981 extended
the availability of IRA's to allemployees and raised the contribution
limit. Now any employee withearnings in excess of $2,000 can contributeup
to $2,000 to an IRA account eachyear, with tax on the principle and
interest deferred untilmoney is withdrawn from the account. Theconthined
contribution of an employee and anon-working spouse can be as high as
$2250. A married couple who are bothworking can contribute $2000 each.
Current tax proposals contemplateraising the individual IRA limit to $2500
and the (non-working) spousal IRA limitfrom $250 to $2500.
Tax-deferred savings are potentiallyan important component of
savings for retirement and couldrepresent a very substantial increase in
tax-free savings for many employees.Indeed, a $2000 contribution to a
retirement account represents a futurepension benefit greater thanmany
employer-provided private pension plans. Theavailability of IRAs may also
have a substantial effect on national
savings. According to IRS data, total
IRA contributions in 1982 wereover 29 billion dollars.-2-
Despite the program's size and potentialsignificance1 suprisingly
little is known about the determinantsof IRA contributions. Thus the goals
of this analysis are: (1) to analyzethe effect of individual attributes on
whether a person contributeS, (2) todetermine the effect of individual
attributes on how much is contributed,and (3) to simulate the effect of
potential changes in contributionlimits on the amount that is contributed
to IRA accounts. The results can beused to judge whether the goals that
justified introduction of the program arebeing realized. In particular,
persons who don't contributeto IRA accounts will not benefit fromthem.
With national concern about the federaldeficit, the short-run tax cost of
the program is of substantial interest.The simulations suggest what this
cost is and what the cost of proposed changesin the program would be. A
fourth issue, the effect of tax-deferred savingson net individual saving,
is not addressed in this paper but will beanalyzed in future work.
The analysis is based on data obtained througha special supplement
to the May 1983 Current Population Survey.
Subsequent analysis will be
based on the 1983 Survey of Consumer Financesand a special Carnegie
Commission Survey of college and university employees.
Descriptive statistics on contributionsto IRA accounts are
presented in the next section. Thestatistical model that is used in the
analysis is described in section II.The results are presented in
section III. In section IV, results of asimilar analysis based on Canadian
data are compared with results for theUnited States. The Registered
Retirement Savings Plan in Canada is atax-deferred program that—3-
incorporates the characteristics of both IRAand Keogh-like plans in the
United States, although the contributionlimits are quite different in the
two countries. The same statistical modelhas been estimated on data from
both countries.
The major empirical findingsmay be summaried briefly: tax-deferred
savings plans are unlikely to be usedby low-income persons. Thus they do
not in general Substitute for privatepension plans, since higher-income
persons are more likely than those with lower incomesto be covered by
private plans. Given income and other individual
characteristics, persons
with private pension plans areno less likely than those without suchplans
to contribute to an IRA. The findingsfor Canada are very similar to those
for the United States. Since the limitsare very different, the similar
findings provide support for the statisticalspecification.
Simulations based on the parameter estimatesfor the United States
indicate that if the limits were increasedin accordance with therecently
proposed Treasury Department changes to the taxsystem, contributions would
increase by about 30 percent.
I. Descriptive Statistics
Since model parameter estimates for theUnited States will
ultimately be compared with those for Canada, thedescriptive statistics in
this section are presented for bothcountries. For several reasons, the
data for the two countries are not
strictly comparable, although they allow
rough comparisons between the two countries.—4-
Most contributions are made by middle income employees.Although
32 percent of employed persons in the United Stateshave incomes below
$10,000, this group is responsible for only about10 percent of total IRA
contributions. Approximately 80 percent of contributions aremade by
persons with incomes between $10,000and $50,000. Persons with incomes
greater than $50,000 contribute only about10 percent of total
contributions. In Canada, about 82 percent of contributions aremade by
individuals with incomes between $10,000 and $50,000 andabout 15 percent by
persons with incomes above $50,000. only3 percent of contributions are
made by those with incomes below $10,000, as comparedwith 10 percent in the
United States. (See table 1.)
As shown in table 2, only 5 percent of persons withincomes less
than $10,000 made an IRA contribution in 1982 in theUnited States, and only
about 2 percent in Canada. The proportions of higherincome groups making
contributions are similar in the United States and Canada, although
in general the proportions are lower in the United Statesthan in Canada.
Whereas the IRA program is new for most people in theUnited States, the
Canadian RRSP plan was started in 1957.
Only 11 percent of all contributors in theUnited States have
incomes less than $10,000, 80 percent have incomes between$10,000 and
$50,000, and about 9 percent have incomes greaterthan $50,000. Again, the
percentages in Canada are very similar tothose in the United States. Seven
percent of contributors have incomes lessthan $10,000, about 88 percent
have incomes between $10,000 and $50,000, and 7 percenthave incomes greaterTable 1. Percent Distribution of Individuals
and of Contributions, by Income Interval a
United States Canada
b Percent of
Income Employed Percent of IRAC Percent ofPercent of RRSP Interval Individuals Contributions Tax FilersContributions
0—iD 31.7 9.9 46.3 2.9
10-20 35.8 26.1 31.0 21.8
20—30 19.8 26.5 15.4 32.0
30-40 7.7 18.1 4.3 182
40-50 2.6 9.1 1.5 9.9
50-60 0.6 5.3 50—70 1.6 6.5
60-70 0.3 3.0




a.The Canadian data pertain to 1980 and theU.S. data to 1982.
Tabulations for the U.S. are in U.S. dollars andthose for Canada in
Canadian dollars. Data for the U.S. are fromthe May 1983 CPS and supple-
mental Survey of Pension and Retirement PlanCoverage. The data are
weighted to represent the employed population,ages 18 to 65, excluding the
self-employed. The Canadian data are based on a randomsample of tax filers
and are weighted to represent all tax filers.
b.In 10,000's.
c.Calculation are based on midpoints ofreported IRA contribution
intervals. (See appendix B.)Table 2. Percent with Contributions Greater than Zeroand




Percent withContribution >0Percent of TotalContributors
United States Canada United Statesc Canada
0-10 5.0 1.9 10.9 6.6
10-20 11.3 13.4 28.0 31.8
20-30 19.2 28.0 26.5 33.1
30—40 32.4 45.1 17.2 14.9





















a. The Canadian data pertain to 1980 andthe U.S. data to 1982.
Tabulations for the U.S. are in U.S. dollars and those forCanada in
Canadian dollars. Data for the U.S. are from the May 1983CPS and supple-
mental Survey of Pension and Retirement Plan Coverage.The data are
weighted to represent the employed population, ages18 to 65, excluding the
self-employed. The Canadian data are based on a random sampleof tax filers
and are weighted to represent all tax filers.
b. In 10,000'S.
c. Calculation are based on midpoints of reportedIRA contribution
intervals. (See appendix B.)—5—
than $50,000.
Proportions that contribute to thecontribution limits in the two
countries are shown in table 3. Becausethe contribution limitsvary
substantially between the two countries, thenumbers must be viewed
accordingly.l In neither country does the
proportion contributing to the
limit inanyincome group exceed 60 percent. Inaddition, women are
apparently more likely than men to contributeto the limit in the United
States, whereas in Canada the difference
seems less apparent, although at
least for persons with incomes below
$50,000 the proportion for women is
greater than for men, with theexception of the zero to $10,000 incomegroup.
Average contributions in the United Statesrange from $75 for the
lowest income group to $1116 forthose with incomes greater than$70,000;
while the average contribution ofcontributors ranges from $1517 to $1883.
(See table 4.) This suggests thatamong those who contribute, a large
proportion in each income group contributesat the limit. Unreported
tabulations indicate that atvery high income levels 85 to 90 percent of
all contributions are at the limit.The percent of employees with
Contributions at the limitranges from about 3 percent for low-income to 50
percent for high income empoyees. Thefigures for Canada are comparable,
but the average contribution levels
are considerably higher, reflecting the
higher limits. In addition, the Canadiandata pertain to both employees and
self-employed persons, while the US datapertain only to employees and thus
exclude contributions to Keoghplans.
Individuals covered by private pensionplans in the United StatesTable 3. Percent with Contributions at the Limit,




Men Women Men Women
0-10 1.0 3.7 0.7 0.6
10-20 3.8 9.2 2.8 4.1
20-30 10.5 19.5 6.3 12.9
30-40 21.8 33.4 17.3 25.1



















a. The Canadian data pertain to 1980and the U.S. data to 1982.
Tabulations for the U.S. are in U.s. dollars and thosefor Canada in
Canadian dollars. Data for the U.S. are from the May1983 CPS and supple-
mental Survey of Pension and Retirement Plan Coverage.The data are
weighted to represent the employed population, ages18 to 65, excluding the
self-employed. The Canadian data are based on arandom sample of tax filers
and are weighted to represent all tax filers.
b.In10,000'S.Table 4. Average Contribution,by Income Interval a
United States Canada Income Percent
Percent Average, with Con- Average, with Con- Interval AverageC Given Contri-tribution Average Given Contri-
tributio bution >Oat Limit bution >0 at Limit
0-10 $75 $1517 2.8 $16 $834 0.7
10—20 176 1564 6.5 176 1315 3.3
20-30 324 1685 12.9 520 1858 7.6
30—40 571 1762 23.3 1059 2346 18.0
40-50 838 1865 35.8 1637 2877 34.3
50-60
2078 3493 38.2 50-70 1010 1887 45.4
60-70









Note: The figures for the UnitedStates are not Comparable becausethe
Contribution limits are different in thetwo countries.
a. The Canadian data pertain to 1980and the U.S. data to 1982.
Tabulations for the U.S. are in U.S.dollars and those for Canada in
Canadian dollars. Data for the U.S.are from the May 1983 CPS andsupple..-
mental Survey of Pension and RetirementPlan Coverage. The dataare
weighted to represent the employedpopulation, ages 18 to 65, excluding the
self-employed. The Canadian data are basedon a random sample of tax filers
and are weighted to represent alltax filers.
b.In 1O,000's.
c. Calculation are based on midpointsof reported IRA contribution
intervals. (See appendix B.)
d. Taken to be greater thanor equal to 95% of actual limit.—6—
tend to make somewhat larger contributions than thosewho are not, and they
are also somewhat more likely to make contributionsat the limit, as shown
in table 5.In Canada, the limit on RRSP contributions increaseswith
income and the maximum is higher for persons without thanfor those with a
private plan. Thus for higher income persons,contributions are higher for
those without private plans. Nonetheless, for most incomeintervals those
with a private pension plan are more likely than those without oneto
contribute at the limit.
In summary: the descriptive data indicate that IRAs are typically
not used by low income employees, and that they do notin general serve as a
substitute for private pension plans.
II. The Statistical Model
The results suggest that relatively unambiguous answers can be
provided to the three questions addressed in this paper.On the other hand,
an analysis of the effect of tax-deferred accounts onnet savings requires
related but new and somewhat more complicated statistical procedures,and it
seems apparent that the question will be answered onlywith more ambiguity
and less confidence than the first three. Thus it is important toset forth
the analysis so that questions that can be answered relatively precisely can
be distinguished from those that inherently leave more roomfor doubt. To
put in perspective the analysis conducted inthis paper, it may be useful to
illustrate how it is related to a more general analysis designed toestimate
the net effect of tax—deferred accounts on individual saving.With thisTable 5. Average Contributionsand Percent with Contribution
at the Limit, by Income Intervaland Private Pension Coveragea
United States Canada
Employees Employees






























































a. The Canadian data pertain to198O and the U.S. data to 1982.
Tabulations for the U.S. are in U.S.dollars and those for Canada in
Canadian dollars. Data for the U.S.are from the May 1983 CPS andsupple-
mental Survey of Pension andRetirement Plan Coverage. The dataare
weighted to represent the employedpopulation, ages 18 to 65, excluding the
self-employed. The Canadian data are basedon a random sample of tax filers
and are weighted torepresent all tax filers.
b. In 1O,000's.
c. Calculation are based on midpointsof reported IRA contribution
intervals. (See appendix B.)
d. Contributes to a RegisteredPension Plan
e. The vast majority of thisgroup do not have a pension plan.-7-
goal in mind, a simple but general
illustrative model is described first.
It serves to motivate statistical analysisof each of the questions, while
providing a framework within whichthe fourth question can be addressed. It
demonstrates succinctly how the first questionsare related to the fourth.
The illustrative model also providesmotivation for treating the first three
separately from the fourth, althoughin principle, one general model could
be used to address all the questions jointly.Estimation procedures
designed to answer the first three questionsare then considered, with
particular attention to whether acorrectly specified single behavioral
equation can be used to describeboth zero and positive levels of
tax-deferred savings, or whether twobehavioral relationships —-one
describing whether a person is a potentialcontributor and the other the
desired amount --arerequired.
A. An Illustrative General Model
Decisions about the amount to save in variousforms are undoubtedly
made jointly so that one decision cannotbe considered fixed while the other
is made. In addition, unmeasuredindividual attributes are likely to affect
saving decisions in each of two or moredifferent forms. Thus persons who
are observed to save more in oneform are likely also to save more in
another, not because savings in one forminduce them to save more in
another but rather because they were moreinclined to save in any form.
This means that one must disentanglethe effects of individual specific
attributes from the effect of savings in oneform on savings in another.-8-
The procedure outlined here addressesthese problems by considering
an individual's preferred allocation ofcurrent income to current
consumption, tax-deferred savings, and other formsof saving, and then how
observed choices are affected by the limiton the tax-deferred savings
alternative. Based on such a model, itwould be possible to simulate, for
example, how total savings would be changed if thelimit on tax-deferred
savings were raised or lowered. The procedure reliesheavily on the fact
that the optimal savings behavior ofindividuals who are not constrainedby
the limit differs from from the behaviorof those who are, with statistical
correction for the fact that persons whoare at the limit, everything else
equal, are likely to have a greater preferencefor saving than those who are
not constrained; they are likely tosave more in any form. In practice, the
idea is to estimate theparameters of a "preference" function whoseprimary
arguments are IRA contributions, at least one otherform of savings, and
current consumption. Associated with thepreference function are optimal
IRA contributions and optimalsavings in other forms. In practice, it is
necessary to choose these "demand" functions to fit theobservable data, and
then to choose the preference functionconsistent with them. The procedure
can be illustrated based on a simple preferencefunction.
To illustrate the idea,suppose that preferences for consumption
and savings out of current incomemay be described by the simple form
—--1121 2
where V is income,
S1 and S2 are tax deferred savings and other savings
respectively, and I3 and 2 are parameters to be estimated.This function-9-
is intended to represent preferences over possible allocations of current
income conditional on individual attributes like income and age, and
individual perceptions of the riskiness of different forms ofsavings.2
This approach allows inferences about the relationship of income allocation
to age, without constraining the functional form to correspond to a
particular life-cycle hypothesis. In practice, the parameterswould depend
uponmeasuredindividual attributes and would be allowed to vary randomly
among individuals to capture unmeasured variationin individual preferences
for current versus future consumption as well as different perceptions of






Butin fact, the optimal choice is subject to a constraint; S1
contributions cannot be greater than the IRA limit L. Until this limit is
reached, contributions obey the equations above. But more generally the
S1 and 2 functions areof the form
r if1Y<L
S1 =







Thus there are two
S2 saving functions. As long as the IRAlimit has not
been reached, savingsobey the optimizing ruleY. But after the limit is
reached, the savings function is ofthe form
[2/(1-1)](y-L)This
illustration ignores the taxdeferment that makes IRA'smore attractive than
alternative forms of retirement
savings. Introducing the tax rate inthe
example changes the utility functionto
(4) V =[Y(1—t)—
S1(i—t) —S] 2 1s2
L 1 2
where, assuming that savingsare small relative to income, t isthe marginal









Inthis formulation, themarginal tax rate does not affect
S (IRA) saving,
unless it affects preferencesfor current versus future
consumption through
•the parameters and The empirical findingsreported below suggest an
uncertain effect of the marginal
tax rate independent of income,even though
the rate of return on the IRAdoes depend on the marginaltax rate.
In practice, the parameters and 2 would be made functionsof—11—
individual characteristics like age, occupation, possiblyincome itself, the
tax rate, and other conditioning variables thatwould be likely to determine
individual preferences over possible allocations of currentincome. To
estimate the model, it is also necessary to choose astochastic
specification for the s. One also needs tochoose a specification that
allows optimal, or "desired", values S1 and S2 to be negative,since many
individuals will not save in any form and indeed willborrow.3
As emphasized above, this particular functionalform is only for
illustrative purposes; the form that is ultimately chosenmust be determined
by the data. But the simple exampledemonstrates how changes in the limit
may affect behavior. In particular. explicitreference to a preference
function assures a specification of savings S2 afterthe limit L on S1 is
reached that is internally consistent with the functionthat applies before
the limit is reached. And, in a fully specified model,estimates of the s
could be used to simulate the effects of changes inthe limit L on total
savings, not just the effect on tax—deferred savings.Estimation of the
S1 function istreated in this paper.4
B. Independent Analysis of Contributions to TaxDeferred Savings
Accounts
Within the general framework described above, one cantreat
separately the tax deferred saving equation.Careful treatment of that
component of the more general specificationis the subject of this section.
There are at least two important issues to addressin analyzing the
determinants of IRA contributions. One is simplythat in addition to the—12—
upper limit on contributions many individuals,
indeed the majority, do not
contribute at all to IRA (or Keogh)
accounts. The standard way to conduct
the analysis in this situationwould be to use a Tobit model witha lower
truncation point at zero and anupper truncation point at the contribution
limit. The second issue, however, isthat the determinants of whetherone
contributes at all may be different fromthe determinants of how muchone
contributes once an account is established.While it is true that the
short run effect of changes incontribution limits on total contributionsis
determined only by initialcontributors, there may be considerablymore room
to change total contributions
through increasing the number ofpersons who
contribute than by increasing theContributions of current contributors.It
is important, therefore, tounderstand the determinants of thecontributor
status decision.
1. Key Issues
To provide accurate predictions ofthe determinants of IRA
contributions and of the effect on
Contributions of changes in theexistir-ig
Contribution limits, the most importantconsideration in estimation is to
account for the existing limit on observedcontributionsThus, an
intuitive discussion of the effect ofthe limit on estimation,together with
procedures that can be used to correct for
-it, helps to put the important
ideas in perspective, althoughpart of the discussion will be familiar to
many readers. Mathematical details of theestimation procedure are
presented in appendix A.
Consider first the diagram infigure 1. Suppose that the—13--
relationship between income and IRA contributionsif there were no
contribution limits would be represented by theline a +by.That is,
given Y the average (expected)contribution would be a +bY.Of course,
for any level of income V there would be adistribution of contribution
levels, represented by the wavy verticallines; not everyone with income
level V would contribute the same amount. Now supposethat everyone in the
sample faced a contribution limit L.We would now observe no contributions
above L and presumably individuals whootherwise would contribute above
this limit would in the face of the limitcontribute at the limit. This
would give rise to a concentration of contributionsat the limit, indicated
by the heavy dots at that level.In addition, it is not possible to
contribute less than zero; we would observe aconcentration of points at
zero, indicated by the heavy dots alongthe horizontal axis. If we think
of fitting a line, say by least squares, tothe data points that are
actually observed, we would obtain afitted line something like the dashed
line in the diagram.
Suppose that from this fitted line weattempted to predict the
relationship between income and contributionsS. It is easy to see that
this estimate would be a very substantial underpredictiOn.Thus it is
clear that standard estimation procedureswill not lead to plausible
conclusions in this case. And it should also beclear from the diagram
that the reason is that observed observationsdo not represent the





Figure 2.Iflustrative Distribution of








FIgure 1, Illustration of Effect of Contribution Limits on Istimation
0 a+bY* L Is—14-
It is useful also to consider the distribution ofcontributions
for persons with a particular level of income, say *•Anillustrative
distribution is shown in figure 2.If it were not for the limit at L and
the limit at zero, the distribution of contributions S wouldlook something
like the bell-shaped curve, but as demonstrated in the figure above, we
know that we will not observe observations greater than L, and wewill
observe no observations less than zero. The distributionof observed
observations between zero and L would look just like the underlying curve.
But instead of a distribution tapering off smoothly tothe right and to the
left, there would be concentrations of observations at Land at zero.
The standard Tobit maximum likelihood estimation procedurethat
takes account of this truncation effect is based on an assumed underlying
relationship like a +bY,as shown in figure 1, together with a
distribution of contributions around this relationship. In this casethere
are three possible outcomes: the contribution is zero,it is between zero
and L, or it is at L. The values of a, b, and c that maximizethe
likelihood of observing the sample values yield estimates of the
relationship labeled a +bYin figure 1, as well as the dispersion of
underlying observation around this expected value. Thusthe estimates that
are obtained need to be interpreted as pertaining tothis underlying
relationship. For example, b indicates the relationship betweenV and S if
there were no limit on contributions. Or, it tells us how anincrease in
income would affect contributions as long as the contributionlimit were
not reached; after that, contributions would be observed atthe limit L but—15—
desired contributions would be above L.
It is also important to realize thatonly persons who are
constrained by the current limit will be affectedby a new higher limit.
(If the limit is lowered, of course,increasingly large numbers of people
will be constrained by it.)Withthe help of figure 2, it iseasy to
determine the effect of small changes in Lon contributions. Consider first
an individual whose observed contribution is lessthan L. Such an
individual could contribute more but choosesnot to; he is not constrained
by the limit. His desired contribution level is lessthan L. So raising
the limit would not increase his contributionlevel. Consider on the other
hand a person who is observed to contributeat the limit L.If L were
raised, this person would likely contributemore. Thus the effect of
raising the limit by 1 is just 1 times theprobability that the individual









Thus for any individual the expectedchange in the contribution level is
equal to the probability that his underlying desiredcontribution is greater
than L.
It is also important to realize that thisderivative depends upon
the level of L. Suppose that L were fartherto the right than is shown in—16—
figure 2, say at L'. The effect oncontributions of an increase in the
limit from L' would be much smaller than the effectof an increase from L
because the likelihood that an individual with incomeY* would like to
contribute more than L' is much lower than the likelihoodthat he would like
to contribute more than L. While all people, oralmost all people with
observed contributions at L would increase theircontributions if the limit
were raised, very few would increase theircontributions to the level L'.
Thus to infer the effect of an increase in the limit oncontributions, it is
recessary to have an estimate of the underlyingdistribution of desired
contribution levels. With an estimate of the distributionof S given Y, it
is possible to predict the expected contribution givenY* for any level of
L.
2. Estimation Possibilities
In practice, estimates that address the issuesmotivated above can
be developed in several ways, depending on the hypothesizedunderlying
process that leads to observed contributions.There are two basic
possibilities. One possibility assumes, as inthe discussion above, that
zero contributions can be thought of simply as aspecial case of a single
underlying preferred contribution behavioral relationship.That is, one
could think of a preferred contribution level thatdeclines continuously
with decreases in income until the zero contributionlevel is reached. The
other general possibility is that there are two underlyingbehavioral
relationships that determine observed contributions: onerelationship
describes the likelihood that a person will be a contributorand the second—17—
relationship describes the desired contribution, should hebe a contributor.
If only one behavioral relationship isassumed, there are at least
three ways to obtain estimates. The alternativeprocedures allow a test of
the underlying assumption itself. Oneprocedure uses all observations
including those with zero contributions; the seconduses only observations
with positive contributions; and the thirduses only the information on
whether a person contributes withoutusing the amount of a positive
contribution.5 If there is, in fact,only one underlying relationship that
determines observed contributions, then each ofthese methods yields
consistent estimates of the parameters of thissingle relationship (except
for the third which yields estimatesup to a variance scaling factor). If
the estimates based on the differentgroups of observations lead to
different estimates, then it is likely that theunderlying process should be
described by two relationships.
If the goal of the analysis were only topredict the effect of
changes in the limits, it is reasonable to concentrateon those who
contribute and to allow the parameter estimates to bedetermined by this
group, since noncontributors are not initially affected bychanges in the
limit. It is at least as important,however, to understand the factors
that determine whether a person is a contributor.As emphasized above,
changes in the number of contributors atany limit could have a much greater
effect on savings than changes in the limit. To theextent that the
determinants of whether one is a contributorare different from the
-
determinantsof the amount of the contribution, it isimportant to consider-18-
both of these relationships. The formaldetails of a two equation model,
together with details of the single equationestimation possibilities and
related tests of behavioral assumptions are presentedin appendix A.
C. The Empirical Specification
In the illustrative specification in sectionA above, desired
contributions to the tax-deferred savings account areof the form S =Y.A
direct statistical counterpart of this specificationis:
(6) S =Yee=ayb.y,eC=a0X1a1x2a2YV.ec
Based on estimates for Canada, this specificationfits the observations on
positive contributions extremely well.Note that the specification implies
that given Y (and the other variables X) thevariance of S increases with Y;
the disturbance term is heteroscedastic. The specificationalso leads to a
constant income elasticity and is convenientlylinear in logs. However this
specification is not appropriate if we incorporatecontributions at zero
and, in the abstract, the possibility ofdesired contributions less than
zero. To consider whether the determinantsof contributor status are
different from the determinants of the amountof positive contributions, a
specification that in principle allows negative aswell as positive values
and one that also fits the observations on positivecontributions must be
used. Such a specification, and one that in practicefits the observed data




where i and £aredisturbance terms and the variance ofrY +£ isgiven by
(8) V(riY + = + =a2
Thus the specification incorporates theproperty that the variance of S
increases with income, and it also allows for"desired contributions less
than zero. The elasticity of desired contributionswith respect to income
is given by (1 +b)÷(1+aIv)and thus approaches 1+b as income
increases.6
For simplification, appendix A, that describesthe details of the
alterantive estimation procedures, is written interms of the specification
S =X+, whereV(c)a2. Development interms of the above specification
may be obtained by replacing X by a +1+band a2 by (aY2 +a).Recall
that the three single-equation approachesuse: (a) all observations
including those with zero Contributions (two—limitTobit); (b) only
observations with positive contributions (one-limitTobit); and (c) only
information on contributor status (probit). Atwo-equation model that
jointly estimates contributor and contribution outcomes isalso described in
appendix A. This model permits the determinants of whethera person
contributes to differ from the determinants of thedesired level of a
positive contribution and allows the stochasticcomponents of the two
choices to be correlated.
In addition, the CPS data on IRA contributionsare reported only by
interval --0,0 to 100, 100 to 500, 500 to 1000, 1000 to2000, etc. Thus
the probabilities of positive contributionsare of the form—20—
(9) •[(u —X)/a]
—4[(1—X)/a]
where u and 1 are the upper and lower bounds of an interval and (.)denotes
the standard normal distribution function. Thus the likelihood function in
this case includes no density function terms; it is composed only of normal
cumulative distribution functions. This may be contrasted with the Canadian
data that record exact prositive contributions.
III. Results
A. Data
The data were obtained through a special supplement to the May
1983 Current Population Survey. The data on IRA contributions pertain to
the 1982 tax year. No information -is provided on 1982 contributions to
Keogh plans. Thus self-employed persons have been excluded from this
analysis. In addition, the raw data pertain to individuals, not families.
Some of the estimates reported below are based on the individual data, with
indicator variables for marital status and sex. Since it is not known from
the person data whether an individual's spouse works, the actual upper
limit on family contributions cannot be determined from the individual data
alone. Some individuals reported contributions greater than $2,000 --
primarilyat $2250 and at $4000, apparently confusing individual
contributions with the family total. When the individual data are used,
contributions above $2000 are not explicitly recorded at that level, but
rather any reported contribution above $2000 is treated as a contribution at
the $2000 limit. Under the model assumption, this procedure still yields-21—
unbiased parameter estimates; it simply doesnot use all information.
Family data were created by matching andcombining information
for individuals in the same household.This allows estimation of family
income and of family IRA contribution limitsbased on the employment status
of the husband and wife. Estimatedmarginal tax rates were also calculated
for the family. The estimates were basedon average marginal tax rates by
income and family status reportedby the IRS. As mentioned above, IRA
contributions for each family member arereported only by interval. The
intervals for a family were obtainedby inferring the possible family
intervals from the possible individualreporting intervals. There are 12
possible family intervals in total. Details of theprocedures used to
create the family data and the tax ratesare reported in appendix B.
B. Parameter Estimates: SingleEquation Models
1. Person Data
Estimates by method of estimation arereported in tables 6 and 7.
Summary statistics for the variables included in eachequation are presented
in appendix table 1. Table 7 includesvariables indicating whether aperson
was covered by a private pension plan and whetherthe worker participated in
a salary reduction plan (401(K) or 403(B)plans which permit workers to
defer compensation); these variablesare not included in table 6.
The first column in each tablepresents estimates based on the two-limit
Tobit specification. The second column showsprobit estimates where the
standard error of c is set at the two—limitTobit estimate (e.g., 5622 in
table 6). This allows easy comparison of thetwo sets of estimates. itTable 6. Parameter Estimates, by Method of Estimation, Person Data
a














.124(.012) .120(.016) .051(.012) .039(.006)
5622(212) 5622 2015(210) 2015
—29712(1039)—29196(758)—6608(1276)—10527(266)
.839(.006) .839(.004) .753(.013) .749(.004)
240(9) 228(8) 110(16) 81(3)
56(244) 17(247) 211(261) 5(87)
7(277) -208(281) 1353(357) —74(99)
2869(209) 2768(208) 1073(238) 986(73)

















-9548.4 —6745.3 -2745.2 —6745.3





































.124(.0]2) .121(.016) .051(.012) .040(.006)
5621(213) 5621 2028(214) 2028
—29608(1039)-29119(761) —6713(1308)-10576(269)
.838(.006) .838(.004) .749(.014) .749(.004)
239(9) 228(8) 110(16) 81(3)
42(244) 6(247) 205(264) 1(88)
6(277) —208(282) 1350(359) -75(100)
2856(210) 2759(209) 1079(241) 990(74)
644(37) 648(36) 108(35) 230(13)
23(162) —18(165) 221(171) —13(59)
789(346) 751(352) 239(326) 262(125)
—9546.0 -6743.2 —2743.9 —6743.2







a. Standard errors are in parentheses.
2999—22—
may be seen that the parameter estimates are virtuallythe same. Whether
there is a difference between the determinants of contribution status and
the determinants of the desired level of IRA contribution may not be
revealed by this comparison, however, since the preponderance of individuals
make no contribution and thus the contribution status (the probit portion)
will dominate the two-limit estimates. The two-limit Tobit estimates will
therefore tend to look like the probit estimates.
A better way to reveal differences in the two relationships is to
separate analysis of contribution amounts from the analysisof contributor
status. The 1-limit Tobit estimates in column three of the tables are based
only on the contributions of contributors, and the probit estimatesof
contributor status in column 4 are obtained by setting the standard error of
e equal to the one-limit estimate (e.g., 2026 in table 6). These last two
columns reveal that the two sets of coefficients are quite similar. The
reported coefficient on income is the estimate of (1 +b).It is virtually
the same in each of the alternative methods, and the estimated parameters on
age seem not to be significantly different in the two cases.The estimated
sex effects are also very close in the two cases, with one exception.The
estimates suggest that unmarried men contribute more than married men but
are apparently rio more likely than married men to contribute. The constant
terms in the two equations differ, although given the estimated standard
errors, the difference may not be as great as the estimated values suggest.
A more formal test is to compare the sum of the likelihood values
from columns 3 and 4 with the likelihood value in column 1. Under the null—23-
hypothesis that one behavioral relationship is sufficientto describe both
contributor status and the amount ofcontributions, the sum of the
likelihoods in columns 3 and 4 will not bestatistically different from the
likelihood value in column 1. Minus 2 times thedifference will be
distributed chi—square with 7 degrees offreedom, with a .05 level of 14.1.
Thus, the hypothesis would be rejected in thiscase. However, the very
large sample size will reveal differences even ifthey have rather small
practical importance.
The coefficient on income of .753 impliesan elasticitiy of desired
contribution with respect to income of .63, evaluatedat the mean of the
data for contributors. The desired contributionincreases by about $110
with each year of age according to the estimatesfor contributors, while the
comparable estimate from the probit equation is $81. Givenother variables,
married women would choose to contribute about$1000 more than married men
and the more educated would contributemore than those with less education.
The estimated unmarried women effect isnot statistically significant.
Summary statistics presented earlier in table 5suggested that
employees covered by a private pension plan weremore likely to contribute
to an IRA. Parameter estimates in table7, however, suggest that the
association between pension coverage and IRAcontributions can be attributed
to other differences in the individual characteristicsof those covered and
not covered by a pension plan. Aftercontrolling for other characteristics,
pension plan coverage is not significantly associated withdesired
contributions. Participation in a salary reductionplan (less than—24—
4 percent of the sample) is positivelyassociated with IRA contributions.
Both the two-limit and the one-limit models fitthe data rather
well. This is demonstrated in table 8. Based onthe estimates in table
6, the predicted proportion of individualswith contributions at zero, at
the upper limit, and within selected intervals are comparedwith the
actual proportions, by income interval. It is importantin interpreting
these results to realize that gross misspecificatioflof the functional
form that relates contributions to income would berevealed in the
comparisons by income level. The comparisonsindicate close
correspondence between predicted and actual proportions.The only
apparent discrepency is that the two-limitTobit specification
underpredicts the proportion of contributionsin the $1000 to $2000 range
and correspondingly overpredicts the proportion ofcontributions at the
limit. Given the differences between a few of thetwo-limt and one-limit
parameter estimates, the similarity ofthe predictions may be surprising.
However, the major difference in parameterestimates is a larger negative
constant term in the two-limit than in the one-limitspecification, that
is offset by a larger disturbance term variance.The likelihood function
is quite flat with respect to these two parameters.Thus the sum of the
last two likelihoods is not in magnitude so differentfrom the two-limit
Tobit likelihood.
2. Family Data
Parameter estimates based on the family data are reportedin table
9. The variable specification is identical to thatused for the person dataTable 8. Model Fit; Actual versus PredictedProportions
by Income Interval, Contribution Interval, andMethod of Estimatjona
Contribution Interval
1—Limit Tobit
.57 .52 —— -— —— —— —— ——
.57.59 —— -— —- —— —— ——
.67.65 —----- —— —- —-
.73.73 —— -— —- —— —— ——
.81.78 —--- -—-- —- ——
.82.83 —— —— —— —— —— ——
.88 .87---- -—---- —-








A P A P
2—LimitTobit
.95.94 .02.03 .03.03 .01.01 .01.01 .01.01
.89.89 .05.04 .06.06 .01.01 .01.01 .02.02
.81.80 .06.07 .13.13 .02.02 .02.02 .03.03
.68.69 .08.09 .23.22 .01.02 .02.02 .05.04
.56.57 .09.09 .35.33 .01.02 .01.02 .07.04
























——.13.13Table 9. Parameter Estimates, by Method of Estimation, Family Data
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.096(.014) .084(.023) .076(.017) .042(.011)
6367(325) 6367 3219(548) 3219
—32111(1428)—31232(1076)—15224(4284)—15860(548)
.776(.027) .756(.039) .810(.033) .701(.038)
200(39) 219(38) —15(70) 109(20)
211(11) 195(12) 219(51) 98(6)
401(384) 207(421) 781(724) 118(216)




























with two exceptions: themarginal tax rate has been added and thedummy
variable for "married-women" has beendeleted, with non-single-person
families the norm group. Married
men and women appear together in the
family data, but as two separateobservations in the person data.
Where the variables are thesame, the parameter estimates arevery
similar to those based on theperson data. For example, the estimated
income coefficient based on thetwo-limit tobit model is 0.78using family
data and 0.84 using person data.The effects of age and educationare also
quite close.
The results suggest no effect ofthe marginal tax rate on the
amount of Contributions but a positiveeffect on contributor status. The
coefficient on the estimatedmarginal tax rate in the two—limit
specification is 200 with a standarderror of 39. This would suggest that
an increase of 10 percentage points in
the marginal tax rate would increase
desired IRA contributions by about$2000. On the other hand, theone-limit
and probit estimates in the lasttwo columns suggest that the taxrate has
no effect on the level of contributions
(column 3) but a positive effecton
contributor status (column 4). Thelatter estimate implies that if all
marginal tax rates were increasedby 10 percentage points --onaverage from
about 24 to 34 --theproportion of persons who contribute wouldincrease
from .134 to .193, or by 44percent.
Canadian estimates for 1981 (reportedbelow) show a much smaller
statistically significant effect of themarginal tax rate on contributor
status, with a smaller and not
statistically significant effect on the-26—
amount of contributions. (But the difference between the two estimatesis
also not significantly different from zero.) Canadian estimates for 1976
show no effect of the marginal tax rate in either equation.7 An alternative
log-linear model for contributors only shows a preciselyestimated zero
effect of the marginal tax rate on the amount of contributions in both 1976
and 1980. Thus the estimated effect seems quite sensitive to the
statistical specification.
Table 10 includes indicators of pension coverage and participation
in a salary reduction plan. These estimates indicate that if at least one
member of a family is covered by a pension plan, the likelihood of
contributing to an IRA is higher. The person data suggested essentially no
relationship. A possible explanation is that married persons without
pensions, but whose spouses are covered by a pension, have a highlikelihood
of contributing to an IRA. In the person data, these people would be
treated as not having a private pension.
C. Simulations: Single Equation Models
Simulations are obtained under three policy assumptions: the
existing IRA program, the proposal contained in the administration's
recent tax reform proposal (U.S. Department of Treasury [1984]), and a
modification of the Treasury proposal that restricts spousal IRAs. The
Treasury proposal increases the limits to $2500 f or both employed persons
and nonemployed spouses. The modified Treasury proposal also increases
the limit for employed persons to $2500 but sets the spousal limit atTable 10. Parameter Estimates, by Method ofEstimation, Family Data a













.088(.014) .063(.025) .078(.017) .030(.012)
6477(327) 6477 3198(550) 3198
—32687(1444)—31470(1032)—15522(4394)—15607(514)
.779(.025) .745(.042) .813(.033) .687(.042)
180(38) 781(423) —29(71) 104(19)
211(109) 192(11) 221(52) 95(5)

























791(435) 781(423) —114(704) 385(208)
-6699.1 -4574.0 —2088.5 —4574.0
15149 15149 2030 15149
13119 13119 —-- 13119
756 2030 756 2030
1274 1274—27—
$500, instead of $2500.
Simulations based on the family data are presentedin table 11.8
To serve as a base for comparison the averageIRA contribution under the
current plan has been simulated for several demographic groups.The model
yields an average predicted contributionfor all families under the current
plan of $312. The simulations indicatethat the Treasury plan would
increase 1982 contributionS by 30 percent to $405 perfamily. The largest
increases are for a married-one-earner familieswhose limit is increased by
the Treasury proposal from $2250 to $5000. The predicted average
contribution for this group would increase from $267 to $475,about 78
percent. The smallest increase, about16 percent, is for
married..twoearner1' families whose limit increased onlyfrom $4000 to
$5000.
The modified Treasury plan yields an overall increaseof about
18 percent. The limit changes, and thuscontributor responses, for
unmarried heads and married-two-earner families arethe same as in the
unmodified Treasury proposal. The modified Treasury planincreases the
limit faced by married-one—earner families by only $750,from $2250
to $3000, instead of $5000. The simulatedincrease in average
contributions by this group is 25 percent, about a third as largeas the
simulated increase under the Treasury plan.
Simulations based on the person data are shown intable 12. Unlike
the family data, the person data do not provide enoughinformation to
completely specify the limit faced by each person.Employed single personsTable 11. Simulated IRA Contributions,by Plan and Family Type,
Based on Family Data a
Current Plan Treasury Plan Mod. Treas. Plan
Family Type (2000/250) (2500/2500) (2500/500)
All Families
Ave. Contribution $312 $405 $370
% Change -- 30 18
Unmarried Head




Ave. Contribution 267 475 335
% Change 78 25
Married,
Two Earners
Ave. Contribution 536 620 620
% Change 16 16
..i .
a.These estimates are unweighted, since itwas not clear










Ave. Contribution $246 $326 $296
Change 33 20
Unmarried Males
Ave. Contribution 120 142 142
%Change 18 18
Unmarried Females
Ave. Contribution 134 158 158
Change 18 18
Married Males
Ave. Contribution 323 469 395
Change 45 22
Married Females
Ave. Contribution 280 332 332
Change 18 18
a. Weighted to reflect national population.-28-
face a limit of $2000. For married couples the limitsare $2000 per person
if both work and $2250 if only one works. If bothwork, then both will
appear in the sample and the appropriate limit for each is $2000.If
only one is employed, however, the nonemployedspouse will not be present -in
thesample, since only employed persons received the CPS pensionsupplement
questionnaire. The appropriate limit for the employedspouse is $2250. The
problem is to assign the "correct" limit ($2000 or $2250) to eachmarried
person inthesample given that we do not know if the spouse is employed.10
If the married person is a woman, a limit of $2000 isassigned, assuming
that her spouse also works. If the marriedperson is a man, the limit is
randomly assigned. With probability P it is set at $2000 and with
probability 1-P at $2250, where P is the proportion of wives ofworking
husbands that are employed.
The person data simulations based on this procedureare quite close
to those obtained using the family data. For allpersons, the simulations
indicate the Treasury plan will increase 1982 contributionsby about 33
percent and the modified Treasury plan will increase contributionsby about
20 percent. The largest effects are for marriedmen, the group facing the
/
largestchange in limits.
0. Parameter Estimates: Two Equation Model
The above results suggest that the observed outcomescan in general
be described well with a single behavioral relationship. Iftwo
relationships are required, the one-limit Tobit and the probit models-29-
together, even if estimated independently,should provide a reasonably
accurate description of the determination of contributions.The
two-equation model described in appendix A, however,distinguishes between a
"potential" contributor behavioral relationshipand the level of desired
contributions, were one to contribute. Under this representation, a
potential contributor could be observed with zerocontributions not because
the person was a non-contributor, but rather becauseincome say was too low
for the person to devote current income to future consumption.To the
extent that the parameters in the two relationshipsdiffer, the
single—equation probit estimates, for example, will not provideaccurate
estimates of potential contributor status. As the parametersin the two
relationships become close, and the correlation betweenthem approaches 1,
however, the two-equation model approaches the two-limitTobit
specification. If only the variable coefficients werethe same, the results
could differ if the correlation between the disturbance termsin the two
relationships were not unity.
Estimation of several two equation models indicated only minor
differences between parameters based on the single equationmodels and those






b C =a+V + V+ ContributionAmount
c c c
The details of the specification and estimation procedure aredescribed in
section II of appendix A. The key distinction between the specification•-30-
used here and the common sample selection specification isthat even
potential contributors can have zero contributions, while otherswould not
contribute under any circumstances. Only the latter are"non—contributors"
in the strict sense.
Illustrative estimates for this model are presented in table13.
In this specification, V() =V(i),V(c) =V(c),and all covariances
other than Coy (, areset to zero.Education is excluded from the
contributions equation. In practice. covariance or exclusionrestrictions
were required for identification of key parameters. Because the likelihood
function was so fiat, more restrictions werenecessary than were in
principle required.
The parameter estimates indicate that the correlation betweenc and
is not significantly different from zero.11 Thissuggests independence of
the contributor and contributions relationships,given measured individual
characteristics. Thus these estimmates arevery close to the single
equation results presented in the last two columns of table 6.12
In principle, however, this specification allows estimation ofthe
proportion of persons who are potential contributors but because of.a
liquidity constraint, for example, are observed not to contribute. The
probability that a person does not contribute is given in this
specification by 1 -Pr[S<0]+Pr[S>0but C <0].Averaged over all
observations in the sample, the proportion of non-contributors is.854, the
same as in the probit estimates based on person data. A proportion .146














































estimated to be .182. Thus, the proportion ofpotential contributors who do
not contribute, Pr[S >0but C <0],is estimated to be .036, about 20
percent of potential Contributors.
IV. Comparison of Results for the UnitedStates and Canada
Since the Canadian and the Americansystems are very similar in
their general outlines, it is informativeto compare the model estimates for
the two countries. The Canadian equivalentof IRA and Keogh plans Is the
Registered Retirement Saving Plan (RRSP). RRSPcontributions are also
tax-deferred and have upper limits determined bothby income and by a
maximum level, The Canadian rules alsoprovide for different limits
depending on whether a person is a member of aprivate pension plan.
Since the Canadian tax system is ona person basis, the most
appropriate comparison is with the person estimates forthe United States.
Estimates analogous to those in table 1 for theUnited States are shown in
table 14 for Canada. While the general modelspecification is identical
in the two countries, the specific variablesdo not correspond precisely.
In particular, the variables forwomen, married, and education are not
included in the Canadian version, and there isno marginal tax rate
variable in the United States version. Thecomparable parameter
estimates, however, are surprisingly similar, basedon a comparison of the
one-limit Tobit and the correspondingprobit estimates in the two
countries. The coefficient on income is .75 inthe United States, while it
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.794(.008) .789(.009) .807(.036) .795(.009)





















a. Standard errors are in parentheses.—32—
approximately $80 to $110 in the United States, while it is $65 to $80 in
Canada. The estimates for Canada also indicate a closecorrespondence
between the one—limit Tobit and the probit estimates,indicating that a
single behavioral relationship apparently describes the observationsrather
well. Indeed for Canada the estimates in the twoequations are not
statistically different, based on the chi—squared test described above.
As discussed above, the estimated effect of themarginal tax rate
in Canada is not statistically different from zero in thecontributions
equation; the estimate for the United States, reported for thefamily data
in table 9, is also not statistically different fromzero. In both
countries the effect of thetaxrate on contribution status is positive,
although it is much smaller in Canada. As emphasized above, theseresults
are very sensitive to model specification and itmay not be possible to
distinguish the effect of the marginal tax rate from a non—linear effectof
income.13
The parameter estimates from a more highly parameterized modelfor
Canada are shown in table 15. The variable temployeew RPP" indicates
individuals in Canada with a private pension plan. Neitherestimate is
statistically different from zero, although the one-limit estimate is
quite negative. In the United States, there appears to beno relationship
between pension coverage and IRA contributions basedon the person data,
although there is some evidence of a positive pension relationship in the
family data.








and 2—Limit 2—Limit 1—Limit 1—Limit
Variable Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
a .113(.004) .105(.009) 080(.082) .088
a 2978(125) 2523(227)
——
Constant —8918(371) -8702(300) —6527(1209)—7390(253)
Income —.203(.005) —.210(.006) —.188(.082)-.224(.006)
MTR 33(5) 34(5) 16(13) 29(4)
Age 60(6) 59(6) 42(14) 50(5)
Sex -45(138) 24(139) -478(385) 19(117)
Govt. Employee —693(220) -796(219) 322(602) —672(185)
Employee w RPP —33(171) 81(170) —721(403) 68(144)
Self—Employed 31(163) —101(164) 724(405) —86(139)
Professional 3995(255) 3133(303) 5312(710) 2644(256)
Farmer—Fisherman—347(255) —582(268) 2067(641) -490(226)
LF —17566.7 —4996.0 -12513.9 —4995.3
N 11019 11019 3169 11019









a. Standard errors are in parentheses.—33—
it is possible to check the validity of the modelspecification for that
country. Between 1976 and 1981, the Canadian Consumer Price Index increased
by about 60 percent, but RRSP limits did not change over theperiod. Thus
in real terms the limits declinedvery substantially between the years.
Thus a good external check of the predictivevalidity of the model is to use
estimates for one of the years to predict contributions inthe other, when
the limit was either considerably higher or much lower.Such predictions,
using the two-limit and the one-limit estimates reported in table15, showr-i
in table 16. In general the predicted valuesare very close to the actual
ones. For example, one-limit estimates for 1981 underpredict 1976
contributions by only 1.7 percent, and one-limit estimates for1976
underpredict 198]. contributions by only 1.1 percent. Estimates basedon the
two-limit model also yield predicted valuesvery close to actual values.
Since the parameter estimates in the two countriesare rather close, this
suggests that the model should predict rather well in the United Statesas
well.
V. Conclusions
Persons with low incomes are unlikely to have IRA accounts. In
addition, after controlling for income, age, and other variables,persons
without private pension plans are no more likely than thosewith them to
contribute to an IRA. Indeed, if anything, those withprivate plans
contribute more than those without them. Both contributorstatus and the
amount of positive contributions are determined in largepart by income andTable 16. Predicted Total Contributions for 1976 Based on 1981Estimates
and
Predicted Total Contributions for 1981 Based on 1976 Estimates,
by Estimation Method, Using Estimation Filesa












a. Estimates are based on parameter estimates in table 15.-34—
to a lesser extent, demographic characteristics. The marginal tax ratemay
have a positive effect on whether one contributes, but does notappear to
influence the contribution amount. Results based on different
specifications suggest that it may be difficult to distinguish the effect of
the marginal tax rate from a non-linear income effect. Simulations basedon
the estimates suggest that the current Treasury Department proposal would
lead to about a 30 percent increase in IRA contributions.14 Model estimates
based on Canadian data for RRSPs are very similar to those for the United
States. External checks of the predictive validity of the model for Canada
indicate that predictions of the effects of limit changes are quite
accurate.—35—
Appendix A: Estimation of IRA Contributions
To estimate IRA contributions, there are two possibilities: the first is to
assume that one underlying behavioral relationship leads to all of the observed
outcomes. In this case there are three ways to estimate the same parameters and
the difference between the estimates can serve as a basis for a test of the
assumption that one behavioral relationship is sufficient. If it is not, the
second method is to assume that observed behavior results from two behavioral
relationships, one pertaining to the decision to be a contributor and the other
describing the desired amount to contribute, were one a contributor. They are
described in turn. The first is familiar to many readers and the goal is simply
to make clear that, under the maintained hypothesis, the three approaches all
yield estimates of the same parameters. The second approach is not as familiar,
but is a generalization of a similar procedure in Deaton and Irish (1984].
I.A Single Behavioral Relationship
Assume the following notation:
sObserved contribution,
SLatent contribution "propensity,'




Latent contributions are specified as
Si =Xii
+Li
where e. is assumed to distributed normal with mean zero and variance a2.-36-
Precise amounts contributed by each individual to an IRA are notreported.
Instead, we know if the individual did or did not contribute and, ifa
contribution was made, the interval in which the contribution falls.




Lti <Si < Lt t =1,T
LT
where, -in the "person" data T =3and L0 =$0,L1 =$500,L2 =$1000,and
L3 =$2000.In the "family" data I =12.
A. Two-Limit Tobit16
When all of the observations are used, there are I +2possible outcomes --
contributionsat zero, contribution within each of the T closed intervals, and













where [•]denotesthe standard normal distribution function.—37—
B. One-Limit Tobit with Zeros Excluded
When the zero values are excluded, there are T + 1 possible outcomes: the
contribution lies within one of the T intervals or at the upper limit. These
outcomes and associated likelihood are:
L -X. L-X.X.
(i) Lt_i < Si < Lt {4( ) — a
1 t =1,T
(2) L -X.X.
(ii) S. =LT, {i —
T 1
The demoninator in each expression, the probability of a positive
contribution, reflects the fact that noncontributors have been excluded from
the analysis. In a single equation model, the underlying distribution of
contributions is truncated at zero when the one-limit Tobit specification is
used, while there is a mass point at zero when the two-limit version is
used.
C. Simple Probit
Finally, estimates can also be obtained with a simple probit specification




(ii) > 0 4 [ —k—-38—
El.Likelihood Function
If there are N0 observations atzero, Nt observations in interval t, and
NT+l observation at the upper limit, the log-likelihood function in eachof
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1+1 Nt E {ln(—2.-—)J
t=1
It is clear that (B) +(C)=(A)under the one—equation assumption. If
this assumption is inconsistent with the data, theestimated from (B)
will differ from theestimated from (C). In addition, to the extent
that they differ, the sum of the likelihoods valuesfrom (B) and (C) will—39-
be greater than the value from (A) since the "separated" models allow a
better fit to the data. Thus a test of the one—equation behavioral
assumption can be based either on a comparison of the estimated 's or on the
likelihood values. If they differ, a specification with two behavioral
equations may be indicated.
II. IRA Contributors and Contributions: A Two-Equation Model
The purpose of this section is to describe a procedure that can be used to
relax the one—equation constraint. It is assumed that two behavioral
relationships determine the contributions that we observe. One is a
relationship between individual attributes and the likelihood that a person is a
potential IRA contributor. The other is a relationship between individual
attributes and the level of desired contributions, were one to contribute. Of
course, both of the outcome variables should be thought of initially as latent
variables. In particular, if the latent contribution variable is less than
zero, we shall assume that we observe no contribution, even if the contributor
latent variable is greater than zero. A desirable property of the model is that
it encompasses as a limiting case the standard Tobit model of section I.
The model is described by:
C=x+ C
S=XcL+17
where C -is the latent contribution variable and S the latent contributor
variable, X -is a vector of individual attributes,and a are vectors of
parameters to be estimated, and c and iaredisturbance terms.17 We assume-40—
that given X, C and S obey the covariance matrix:
2= apa1
where p is the correlation between C and 5,given X.
The bivariate distribution between S and C isrepresented graphically in the
figure below. The figure includes the limit on IRAcontributions L. That is,






concentration at the level L. We shall assume that a person is a contributor if
the latent contributor variable S is greater than zero, and his desired
contribution amount is greater than zero. Thus when S and C are both greater
than zero we observe IRA contributions greater than zero but less than or equal
to L.
As in the usual Tobit case, there are three observable outcomes: IRA
contributions are zero, contributions are at some level C where C is greater
than zero but less than L, or we observe C at the limit L. The likelihoods
associated with these three outcomes are now
Outcome Likelihood
C =0 Pr[S <0]+Pr[S>0and C <0]
L <C<L Pr[S >0and L <C<L],t=1,T
t—1 t t—1 t
C =L Pr[S >0and C >L]
They are described in somewhat more detail by
Outcome Likelihood
C =0 [-Xa] +42[Xa, —p)
Lt
-X
<< -t2' a p]t1, T




C = L 42[Xa, a—42-
where indicates the bivarjate normal distributionfunction.
If indeed C and S are the sameunderlying stochastic variable, as in the
Tobit case,goes to a and p goes to 1.18 Thus in this case, thetwo-equation
description of IRA contributions reduces to the Tobitspecification. By
comparing the likelihood values in the two models, onecan test explicitly
whether the single behavioral equation versioncan be rejected. The difference
between this test and those mentioned in sectionI, -is that the two equations
are allowed to be correlated.—43—
Appendix B: U.S. Data Sources
All data for the U.S. -is from the May 1983 CPS and Supplemental
Survey of Pension and Retirement Plan Coverage.Two data sets were
created: person and family.
A. Person Data
The CPS data -is arranged by person. The sample used includesall
persons meeting the following criteria:
1. Included in the supplement (working for pay)
2. Between the ages 16 and 65
3. Not self—employed
4. Containing valid responses for each of the variablesused in
Table 7.
All summary tables and simulations (but not the estimated models)
using person data use the CPS weights designed to representthe nation as a
whole. No adjustment to these weights was made for exclusionof
observation due to invalid responses.
Several problems arose with the way the IRA variables werecoded.
Employed persons were asked "Do you have an IRA?".Those answering in the
affirmative were then asked: "Approximately how much of your ownIRA did








Thiscategorization led to two problems. First, a surprisingly large
number of persons reported IRA contributions in the first (under$100)—44-
category. Most of these responses probably indicatepersons establishing
IRAs prior to 1982 and making no contribution in1982. We have thus
interpreted the first category to indicate zero contributionsin 1982.
Second, a small number, 186, of respondents indicateda
contribution exceeding $2500. Theseresponses presumably reflect family
rather than own contributions. These observations havebeen deleted from
our sample.
B. Family Data
For tax status the family is a more appropriate unit thanthe
person in the United States. Using relationship codes,ages, and marital
status we have converted the CPS data to a family basis. Theincidence of
unclassifiable persons or otherwise inconsistent unitswas rather high. In
such cases, the observations were deleted from the sample.19One
consequence is that use of the CPS weights is no longer appropriate.
There are two important advantages to forming afamily based
sample. The first is that the employment status of husband and wife -in
two-personfamilies can be determined. This permits unambiguousassignment
of contribution limits used to simulate policychanges.
The second advantage is that marginal tax ratescan be calculated
based on the family information. Our calculationsare based on U.S.
Internal Revenue Service 1984], Statistics of Income for1982. This
source reports average adjustments and deductions by incomecategory. The
first step is to convert each family's reported total incometo adjusted—45--
gross income by accounting for average adjustments(excluding IRAs and
Keoghs) by income class. To obtain taxable income, personal exemptions
($1000 for self, spouse if married, and each child) and the average
itemized home mortgage interest deduction (in excess of the standard
deduction if one were not to itemize) for families reporting owning a home
are subtracted from gross income. Finally, 1982 taxtables by filing
status provide the marginal tax rates assigned to each family.These
calculated rates span the entire range from zero to fifty percent.—46—
Appendix Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable


































a. In the family data the value for this variablepertains to the CPS
reference person in the household.
b.In the family data the value for this variable isone if either member
participates; zero otherwise.—47-
Notes
1.In general, under the Canadian plan persons can contribute 20 percent
of income up to a maximum of $3500 for those with a private pension planand
$5500 for those without a private plan.
2. This may be contrasted with portfolio composition analysismost
recently represented in the work by King and Leape [1984] orearlier work by
Feldstein [1976] for example.
3. Given current income, contributions to tax deferred accountscould
of course be taken partially or entirely from other existing asset
balances. The identification problem is to determine whetherthis is the
case. It is not possible to address this issuewith the CF'S data, but it
will be considered in subsequent analysis based on other data sources.
4. As far as we know, a model like this one has not beenestimated.
In any event, data limitations and other choices in the empirical
implementation would undoubtedly leave uncertainty aboutthe effect of tax
deferred accounts, as well as the effect on tax-deferred contributionsof
changes in the contribution limits. Answers tothese questions are
important in their own right and can be answeredwith considerable
confidence.
5. By referring back to figure 2, one can see the difference between
these procedures. If all the data are used, then there is aconcentration-48—
of observations at zero and at L.If the zero observations are deleted,
there is no concentration of data points atzero, but the distribution is
truncated at this point and the concentration at L remains.The third
procedure only considers whether contributions are zero or not.
6. The preference function that corresponds to(7) is
V(Ys,s) =(S/)e
+
wherea=a +ax +...a.x, +c.andyb+n u KK
7.The estimates are in fact negative but notstatistically different
from zero.
8. Given program limits, the estimated parameters, and valuesof X for
each member of the sample, the expected contribution of eachindividual or
family is (following the notation of appendix B):




+ g[(X)—•(—)] + [1-____
9.This estimate may be compared to the average IRA deduction based
on IRS wage and salary returns which was $340 for 1982.-49-
10. Note this lack of information poses a problem for prediction but
not for estimation. The statistical model used to obtain parameter
estimates assigns all married persons an open-ended upper limit of
$2000 or more.
11. The implied correlation between (riY +c)and (rY + isabout
-0.01.
12. It may be noticed that the sum of the individual likelihood
functions is 9490.5, whereas the likelihood value for the joint
specification is somewhat higher, 9497.8. The higher likelihood value
results from the equal variance restrictions on ri and the exclusion of
education from the contribution equation.
13. Indeed for some years the estimated effect in Canada is in fact
negative, although not statistically different from zero.
14. Strictly speaking, the simulations indicate that had the Treasury
proposal been implemented in 1982, contributions would have been 30 percent
higher than they were.
15. In principle the open intervals can be treated as closed intervals
by setting limits of -or.Wetreat open and closed intervals
separately for expositional purposes only.
16. To simplify matters this appendix derives likelihood functions for
a linear specification of Si and a homoscedastic error structure. The—50--
estimated model is based on theparameter and error structure given by
equation (5) in the text.
17. In practice, this model is alsoestimated with a nonlinear
specification with a heteroscedastic errorstructure, with equations
analagous to those in the text.
18. First consider the C =0case. Under the limiting case, the
probability of S greater than zero and C less thanzero goes to zero
because this would be an outcome withzero likelihood. Thus, the bivariate
distribution function drops out. TheLt1 <C<Ltand C =
L1cases





>L.Jrespectively. The first term in each case
goes to unity in the limiting case, since if C isgreater than some positive
Lt, S must also be greater than zero. Thus in bothcases the bivar-iate
distribution in the last term of likelihoodsreduces to expressions containing
only univariate cumulative distributions.
19. For example, we eliminatedpersons married but living in a single
person household. Heads with the other relativesbut not married were
treated as single persons.—51—
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